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cation. However, these statutes apply only after apprehension and
conviction of the violator. Therefore, in light of the rising traffic
fatality rate, Virginia must find more effective methods for the ap-
prehension and conviction of violators, so that these provisions can
serve their purpose of making Virginia roads safer.
CHARLES B. ROWE
IMPEACHING ADVERSE PARTY CALLED AS
ONE'S OWN WITNESS
Whether and under what circumstances a party may impeach an
adverse party called as his own witness has been a subject of con-
troversy. The common law forbade the calling party to impeach his
own witness, regardless of whether the witness was an adverse party
or not.1 The growth of the common law concerning this subject took
its root in the idea that a party's own witness could not be discredited
by him.2 When a party offers a witness he is considered to be vouching
for his credibility, and therefore later to attack the witness's general
character for truth and veracity would indicate an act of bad faith
toward the court.3 In the United States, the general rule has become
well established that, subject to certain exceptions, a party may not
impeach a person called as his own witness, 4 whether that witness is
the adverse party or not.
2McCormick, Evidence § 38 (1954).
Nash, The Law of Evidence in Virginia and West Virginia § 35 (1954); 98
C.J.S. Witnesses § 477 (1957).
3Oates v. Glover, 228 Ala. 656, 154 So. 786 (1934); Hall v. Incorporated Town of
Manson, 99 Iowa 698, 68 N.W. 922 (1896); Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, ii6 N.E.
78 (1917); Carlisle v. Norris, 215 N.Y. 400, 1o9 N.E. 564 (1915); Arthur v. Parish,
150 Ore. 582, 47 P.2d 682 (1935).
4Dravo v. Fabel, 132 U.S. 487 (1889); Pollard v. State, 2o Ind. i8o, 166 N.E.
654 (1929); Hall v. Incorporated Town of Manson, 99 Iowa 698, 68 N.W. 922 (1896);
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 8, 43 S.W.2d 185 (1931); Webber v. Jackson,
79 Mich. 175, 44 N.W. 591 (189o); Richeson v. Roebber, 349 Mo. 132, 159 S.W.2d
658 (1942); Blochwitz v. Blochwitz, 122 Neb. 385, 240 N.W. 586 (1932); Fox v. Forty-
Four Cigar Co., 90 N.J.L. 483, 1o At. 184 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917); Carlisle v. Norris,
215 N.Y. 4oo, 1o9 N.E. 564 (1915); People v. DeMartina, 213 N.Y. 203, 107 N.E. 5ol
(1914); Helms v. Green, io5 N.C. 251, 11 S.E. 470 (189o); Culpeper v. State, 40
Okla. Grim. 1o3, 111 Pac. 679 (191o); Arthur v. Parish, 15o Ore. 582, 47 P.2d 682
(1935); People's Nat'l Bank v. Hazard, 231 Pa. 552, 80 Ad. 1O94 (1911); Pearson
Hardwood Flooring Co. v. Phillips, 22 Tenn. App. 206, 120 S.W.2d 973 (1938); In
re Campbell's Will, 1oo Vt. 395, 138 Ad. 725 (1927); Washington & O.D. Ry. v.
Jackson's Adm'r, 117 Va. 636, 85 S.E. 496 ('915); Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89
Va. 679, 17 S.E. 238 (1893); Chappell v. Puget Sound Reduction Co., 27 Wash. 63,
67 Pac. 391 (19o); State v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac. 526 (1925).
1964] VIRGINIA COMMENTS -71
The common law arbitrarily excluded, as incompetent to testify,
all parties or others who were shown to have a direct pecuniary or
proprietary interest in the outcome of the litigation.5 While at first
the competency of parties was limited, all limitations have now been
generally swept away. A party is competent as a witness in his own
behalf and may be compelled to testify for others.6 In Virginia, if the
adverse party refuses to take the witness stand when called, the court
may dismiss the suit or disregard the defense of the party so refusing.7
One party to an action may want to call his adversary as his own
witness in two principal situations: (i) where the adverse party has
presented his evidence without taking the witness stand himself, and
the opposite party wants to question him concerning that evidence, (2)
where the plaintiff calls the defendant to the witness stand at the
opening of the case in order to catch the defendant "off guard and
cause him to make significant admissions corroborative of the plain-
tiff's case." s
The adverse party seems to have been called for some other pur-
pose, however, in the recent decision of Smith v. Lohr.9 This case
presented the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia with the oppor-
tunity to decide whether one party to an action may impeach his ad-
versary for truth and veracity when such person is called by the im-
peaching party. Smith v. Lohr was an action to recover damages for in-
juries received by the plaintiff in an automobile collision. Counsel for
the plaintiff called the defendant as an adverse party at the opening of
the case, and proceeded to question the defendant concerning the acci-
dent. After both the plaintiff and defendant had concluded with their
evidence, counsel for the plaintiff asked and received permission to
recall the defendant to the stand. The plaintiff's counsel then asked the
defendant on redirect examination if he had ever been convicted of a
felony. The defendant objected but the objection was overruled.10
In deciding the case, the court had to construe the Virginia statutes
on impeachment. The Virginia statute provides that an adverse party
called as one's own witness may be examined according to the rules
applicable to cross examination,". which would seem to allow any
r3 Jones, Evidence, § 766 (5th ed. 1958).
'Id. at § 768.
Wa. Code Ann. § 8-29o (Repl. Vol. 1957).
8Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials § 268, at 413 (1949).
22o4 Va. 331, 13o S.E.2d 433 (1963).
1 o4 Va. at 332, 130 S.E.2d at 434.
""A party called to testify for another, having an adverse interest, may be
examined by such other party according to the rules applicable to cross examina-
tion." Va. Code Ann. § 8-291 (RepL. Vol. 1957).
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type of impeachment. However, the court held applicable the broader
Virginia statute which concerns the impeachment of one's own wit-
nesses in general, and which prevents a party producing a witness from
impeaching his credit by evidence of bad character.12 Under the Code
of 19o4, these two statutory provisions were included under the same
Code section, and is was clear that the provision pertaining to impeach-
ment of witnesses in general applied to adverse parties also. 13 The
court felt that the original legislative intent still governed, even though
the original statute has been split into two sections.14 In reversing
and remanding the case for retrial, the Supreme Court of Appeals
said:
A reading of the Code... nowhere indicates that it was the
intention of the legislature to permit a litigant to call an adverse
witness for the purpose of helping his case and later impeach
his credibility by evidence of bad character as was done in this
instance. Such a rule would permit one to call a witness known
to be unworthy of belief for the purpose of proving his case.15
The Virginia court also implied criticism of the method by which
the defendant was recalled to the stand as the last witness for the pur-
pose of asking him whether he had been convicted of a felony. The
court concluded that such procedure was prejudical to the defendant.' 6
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, states that the one place
where the common law rule against impeaching one's own witness
most clearly breaks down is where one party to an action calls his
adversary as a witness.' 7 Wigmore further states that to say the calling
party vouches for the adverse party "is to mock him with a false
formula."'' 8 However, it is questionable whether Wigmore would still
allow impeachment when the plaintiff recalls the defendant as the last
witness in order to impeach him as was done in the Smith case. In
making such a statement, Wigmore was most likely referring to the
situation where the adverse party has presented his evidence without
taking the stand, and the opposite party calls him as his own witness.
2 "A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by
general evidence of bad character, but he may, in case the witness shall in the
opinion of the court prove adverse, by leave of the court, prove that he had made at
other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony...." Va. Code
Ann. § 8-292 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
WVa. Code § 3351 (Pollard 19o4).
1"2o4 Va. at 334, i3o S.E.2d at 435.
251bid.
162o4 Va. at 336-37, i3o S.E.2d at 437.
13 Wigmore, Evidence § 916, at 431 (3d ed. 19i4o).1Blbid.
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The question of whether the calling party can impeach the adverse
party called as his witness has not come up frequently because of
the common law rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness.'
0
Therefore, whether impeachment of the adverse party called by the
impeaching party will be permitted, is determined by the statute en-
acted in the particular state involved, and partially by the procedure
by which the adverse party is summoned and impeached. These
statutes fall into three classifications: (i) those which prevent impeach-
ment by the calling party regardless of the situation in which the
adversary is called, (2) those which are ambiguous, and so the particu-
lar factual situation in which the adverse party is called will usually
be controlling, and (3) those which allow impeachment as long as the
situation in which the adversary is called appears proper and in good
faith.
In those states20 which prohibit impeachment by the calling party
regardless of the situation in which he is called, the applicable statute
is usually modeled after the English Procedure Act of 1854. This Act
provides that "a party producing a witness shall not be allowed to
impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character," 21  and no
"In re Erickson, 13 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); Murphy v. Pickel, 264 Ala.
568, 87 So. 2d 844 (1956); Price v. Cox, 24a Ala. 568, 7 So. 2d 288 (1942); Tullis v.
Tullis, 235 Iowa 428, 16 N.W.2d 623 (1944); Federal Land Bank v. Bennett, 226
Iowa 112, 284 N.W. 97 (1939); Pike v. Coon, 217 Iowa io68, 252 N.W. 888 (1934);
Horneman v. Brown, 286 Mass. 65, 19o N.E. 735 (1934); Toler v. Owens, 231 Miss.
753, 97 So. 2d 728 (1957); Hutchinson v. Steinke, 353 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962);
Cavalier v. Bittner, 186 Misc. 848, 6o N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1946); State v. Tilley,
239 N.C. 245, 79 S.E.2d 473 (1954); Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P.2d
968 (1948).
Ark. Stat. § 28-706 (Supp. 1962); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-16 (1953); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-178 (1958); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 9o.o9 (196o); Hawaii Rev. Laws
§ 222-27 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-1207 (1947); I1. Ann. Stat., ch. 1io § 6o (1956);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1726 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 28-60-2803 (1949);
Mass. Gen Laws ch. 233, § 23 (1959); Mich. Stat Ann. § 27A-2161 (1962); Miss. Code
Ann. § 171o (1942); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.030 (Supp. 1952); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 93-19o1-9 (1947); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:81-11 (1952); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-4 (1953);
N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 8-a; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 383 (1951); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
28, § 381 (1958); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-17-14 (1956); S.C. Code § 26-510 (1962);
Wash. Rev. Code § 5.o4.oo (1963); Wis. Stat. Ann § 325.14 (1958); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
1-141 (1957). Compare Ala. Code. tit. 7. § 484 (Recomp. 1958); Iowa Code Ann. §
622-.17 (1946); La. Rev. Stat. 15:487 (1950); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.52; Tex Code
Crim. Proc. Act 8-7-732a (1941).
n 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 § 22 provides: "A party producing a Witness shall not be
allowed to impeach his Credit by general Evidence of bad Character, but he may,
in case the Witness shall in the Opinion of the Judge prove adverse, contradict him
by other Evidence, or, by Leave of the Judge, prove that he has made at other
Times a Statement inconsistent with his present Testimony...." See also Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 38, at 72 (1954).
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exception is made for the case where the witness is the adverse party.
In Labrie v. Midwood,22 an action for criminal conversation, the
defendant was called as a witness by the plaintiff during the presen-
tation of the plaintiff's evidence in chief. At the conclusion of the
defendant's testimony, the plaintiff sought to impeach him for con-
viction of a crime. The procedure by which the defendant was sum-
moned to the stand was apparently proper, as no mention of this aspect
of the case was made by the court. The statute in effect provided that
"the party who produces a witness shall not impeach his credit by
evidence of bad character." 23 The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts held the impeachment improper because it came within
the express prohibition of their statute.24 and in Lomesto v. Hamil-
ton,25 an action contesting the probate of a will, the plaintiff properly
and in apparent good faith called the defendant in the presentation
of his evidence in chief. The plaintiff then attempted to impeach the
defendant by showing the conviction of a crime. The applicable
statute provided that a party producing a witness "shall not impeach
his credit by evidence of bad character." 26 The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that such impeachment was improper under the
wording of their statute.2
7
In those states28 where the statutes are ambiguous or conflicting
on impeachment of the adverse party, the situation in which the ad-
verse party is called is the determining factor. If the court feels that
the adverse party was properly summoned as a witness in good faith,
impeachment is allowed. 29 But where the defendant is recalled as
the last witness in the case, as was done in Smith, for the sole purpose
of impeachment, the court will disallow impeachment. In determin-
ing that the manner in which the plaintiff recalled the defendant was
highly prejudicial to the defendant, the Smith court was attempting
to add weight to its decision that such impeachment was improper
under the Virginia statute. But in doing so, the court implied that the
result might have been otherwise had the plaintiff impeached the
defendant at the beginning of the case, when the plaintiff first exam-
ined him.
'273 Mass. 578, 174 N.E. 214 (1931).
"Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 23 (1959).
21 174 N.E. at 216.
- 76 R.I. 114, 68 A.2d 39 (1949).
"R.I. Gen. Law Ann. § 9-17-14 ('!56).
2768 A.2d at 41.
'Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2049, § 2051. Va. Code Ann. § 8-291, § 9-292 (Repl.
Vol. 1957).
2OLovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 243 P.2d 561, 575 (Cal. 1952).
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The District Court of Appeals in California, in the case of Lov-
inger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank,30 reached the opposite result from the
Virginia court in a slightly different situation, but agreed with the
Smith court on an important issue. Lovinger was an action against
an executor by a woman who claimed the reasonable value of her
services rendered to the decedent. Coplin was the executor of the will
and was sued as the original defendant.31 (Since Coplin was no longer
the defendant, there is some question whether he was an adverse party,
but the court referred to him as such.) The plaintiff questioned Coplin
for the duration of two days and rested. After the defendant rested
the plaintiff asked and received permission to recall Coplin. The plain-
tiff then asked Coplin if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Cali-
fornia had adopted the English Procedure Act,32 but a further provi-
sion of their Code provided that a "witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called... it may be shown ... that he had
been convicted of a felony." 33 The California court, in light of these
two provisions of its code, held the impeachment of Coplin entirely
proper. However, it agreed with the Smith court on one important
point:
"It should be pointed out that ordinarily this type of ques-
tion should not be left until rebuttal. Unless there is some good
reason for not using it on the first calling of the witness, it
should not be permitted on rebuttal and particularly as the only
or main subject of rebuttal .... In holding that conviction of a
felony may be shown by the party calling the adverse party
under section 2055, we desire to point out that the adverse
party should never be called solely for that purpose."34
In those states35 allowing impeachment of the adverse party by
the calling party, the applicable statute is usually modeled after
Federal Rule 4 3 (b). This rules provides that "a party may call an
adverse party... and interrogate him by leading questions and con-
tradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by
wIbid.
m1d. at 574.
2Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 2049 (1955).
-Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 2o51 (1955).
31Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, supra note 29.
3Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Civ. Rule 43(g) (1956); Del. Code Ann., Super Ct. Rules,
Rule 4 3 (b) (1953); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-i8ol (1954); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., Rules of
Civ. Proc., Rule 43.06 (1953); Me. Civ. Proc., Rule 43 (b) (1959); Md. Ann. Code art.
35, § 9 (1959); Minn. Stat. Ann., Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 43.02 (1958); Nev. Rules
Civ. Proc.. Rule 4 3 (b) (1959); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516.24 (1955); N.D. Code Ann.,
Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 43(b) (ig6o); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 45-590 (1961); S.D. Code
§ 36.028 (Supp. 196o); Utah Code Ann., Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 43(b) (1953);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1641a (1958). See generally Annot. 35 A.L.R.2d 756, 759 (1959).
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the adverse party...,"3 6 As long as the adverse party is called in a
proper situation, courts will allow impeachment by the calling party
where a statute like Federal Rule 4 3 (b) is in effect. In Lindsay v.
Teamsters Union, Local 74,37 the defendant called the plaintiff, one
of the co-partners of the plaintiff partnership, as an adverse party in
presenting its case. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in comment-
ing on this situation, stated that the defendant could have impeached
the plaintiff on material matters as if the plaintiff had originally been
called by his own counsel.38 And in Walsh v. Schafer, 39 the defendant
called the plaintiff to the witness stand in presenting his case. The
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the party producing the adverse party as a witness could impeach him
as if he had taken the stand on his own, and provided further that the
defendant was not bound by the plaintiff's testimony.
40
Where one party to the action presents his case without taking the
witness stand, and the adverse party is forced to call him as his own
witness, Wigmore is correct in saying that the calling party should be
allowed to impeach his adversary as if he had taken the stand on his
own. But where the plaintiff calls the last witness in the case for the
sole purpose of impeaching him, as was done in Smith, Virginia has
taken the only tenable position.
PHILIP D. SH1ARP, JR.
1Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(b), 28 U.S.C. 5164 (1958).1Id. at 694.
'*Walsh v. Schafer, 6i A.2d 716 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1948).
401d. at 718.
